Integrity & Anticorruption

Since 2018, ADB has run a sustained capacity-building program with PRC contractors and institutions bidding on international contracts — many of whom, lacking familiarity with global integrity standards, have ended up on ADB’s or other multilateral development banks’ sanctions lists [1]. Rather than relying on enforcement alone, ADB partnered with the Xiamen National Accounting Institute to run annual Anticorruption and Integrity Forums, now in their third year, covering public procurement, financial management, and environmental and social safeguards [2]. The first forum drew 254 participants, with 98% reporting they intended to apply what they learned immediately [3]. From 2024 onward, the forum expanded beyond PRC participants to contractors from across the wider Asia-Pacific region [2].

Evidence

What made this work?

• Capacity building works best paired with real consequence — ADB’s sanctions list gives these forums genuine stakes, not just goodwill training.
• Bringing multiple multilateral development banks into the same room avoids contractors learning one bank’s rules and assuming they all match.
• A 98% stated intent to apply lessons is a useful signal, but it’s self-reported immediately after the event — durable impact would need follow-up data over time.

Where else could this apply?

• Asia-Pacific Anticorruption and Integrity Strengthening

  ADB technical assistance · TA 58281-001
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• 2nd Asia-Pacific Anticorruption and Integrity Forum — Remarks

  ADB speech · August 2024
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• 3rd Asia-Pacific Integrity and Compliance Forum

  MCDF event page · September 2025
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Adaptation guidance for other countries

• Pair training with real consequences, such as sanctions exposure, rather than relying on goodwill-only capacity building.
• Bring multiple multilateral development banks together so contractors learn one consistent standard, not bank-specific rules.
• Track applied behavior change over time, not just post-event satisfaction surveys.

The Xiamen forums build capacity before problems happen. ADB also has a defined process for what happens after one is found. In October 2024, ADB replaced its previous Integrity Principles and Guidelines with a new Investigation and Enforcement Framework, effective 21 October 2024, governing how allegations are investigated and how sanctions are applied [1]. The system runs on a dedicated sanctions structure — an Integrity Enforcement Committee and a separate Enforcement Appeals Committee — so a firm found in violation can be debarred, and that debarment can extend across other multilateral development banks under cross-debarment agreements, with a defined route to appeal [2].

Evidence

What made this work?

• Separating the body that investigates from the body that hears appeals gives the process a credible internal check.
• Cross-debarment with other multilateral development banks means a sanction has consequences far beyond one institution’s own contracts.
• A formal appeals route makes the system harder to challenge as arbitrary — due process is part of what gives sanctions their legitimacy.

Where else could this apply?

• Investigation and Enforcement Framework

  ADB institutional document · October 2024
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• ADB Sanctions System

  ADB policy page
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Adaptation guidance for other countries

• Separate the investigating body from the appeals body before the system is ever tested by a real case.
• Pursue cross-debarment agreements with other MDBs early — the deterrent value compounds with each additional institution involved.
• Publish a clear, accessible appeals process — legitimacy depends on the process being visibly fair, not just procedurally correct.